

## Supplementary Appendix to “Undermining Resistance: Mobilization, Repression, and the Enforcement of Political Order”

### **Overview**

The follow materials can be found in this Appendix:

Section 1 presents a series of robustness checks based on modifications of the core specification of the paper’s analysis. Across the different specifications, radical mobilization is shown to be robustly related to increased repression.

Section 2 provides a discussion of the substantive effects of radical mobilization on repression. Estimates of mobilization and repression are presented under a variety of contextual settings.

Section 3 presents a more extensive discussion of the different data sources used in the study. Disaggregated event counts by source are presented along with spatial and temporal comparisons. This section also provides summary statistics at the department-month level.

Section 4 discusses issues concerning the theoretical and empirical distinction between mobilization and overt collective challenges.

Section 5 presents the coding manual used to collect the data, while also providing a more extensive discussion of the sampling protocols.

### **Section 1: Robustness Checks**

This section presents a series of robustness checks based on modifications of the paper’s core model specification. The first subsection analyzes the relationship between radical mobilization and overt and covert forms of political repression. This subsection also probes the sensitivity of the analysis to a division of overt collective challenges into radical and non-radical subcategories. The second subsection delves into the temporal dynamics at play in order to test the robustness of the findings. In this subsection, the analysis investigates the inclusion of a control for contemporaneous overt collective challenges as well as an alternative replication that excludes all department-months jointly experiencing mobilization and overt collective challenges. The final replication in

this subsection looks at a sample of department months that are essentially “pre-conflict” by identifying the first instance of overt collective challenges observed in a department and dropping that month along with all subsequent months. The third subsection investigates alternative strategies for estimating fixed-effects specifications. The fourth subsection investigates a series of Instrumental Variables models examining the effect of seemingly exogenous variation in mobilization affects repression. Finally, the fifth subsection examines the robustness of the findings to a model in which governments are forward looking in their application of repression. This subsection employs a form of dynamic time-series analysis known as vector-error corrected (VEC) models to see if repression is significantly related to expectations of future radical mobilization.

Across all of the specifications, radical mobilization is consistently shown to be related to increases in repressive action. The robustness of this result to a battery of alternative specifications and estimation strategies should provide additional confidence in the validity of the finding.

### *Subsection 1: Overt and Covert Repression, Radical and Non-Radical Overt Collective Challenges*

Measures of repression are often divided into two categories: covert and overt repressive actions.<sup>1</sup> *Overt repression* involves public (and commonly violent) displays of coercive force in which the targets are aware of the action and of the identity of the perpetrator. Examples include death threats, torture, disappearances, shootings, raids, protest policing, and politically motivated arrests. *Covert repression* involves private (and often non-violent) coercive actions in which the target is intended to be unaware of the

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<sup>1</sup> On the distinction between overt and covert repression see Davenport (2005). For more on the functioning of covert repressive activities see Cunningham (2005), Davenport (forthcoming), and Marx (1988).

activity. Examples include surveillance, wiretapping, informing other officers, initiating an investigation, and drafting security plans.

This analysis replicates the principal analyses in the original draft, while dividing repression into overt and covert subcategories. The purpose of the categorical division is somewhat different here than in the division between covert mobilization attempts and overt collective challenges, however. Acts of dissent were divided in order to test propositions regarding how different challenger activities influenced repressive action. By contrast, the two forms of repressive action are divided here in order to counter a possible objection that repressive behavior related to mobilization differs in kind from repression related to overt collective challenges. More specifically, it could be argued that mobilization produces repressive activities that are more covert in nature, such as surveillance and other investigative practices, while overt collective challenges produce more overt repressive activities, such as raids or torture, which can be more easily observed. To counter such an objection, political repression is divided into overt and covert activities and the analyses below estimate the effects of different forms of dissident behavior on each. The results are presented in Table AI.

**Table AI: Robustness Checks on Types of Repression and Challenges**

	Covert Repression (A1)	Overt Repression (A2)	All Repression (A3)
Radical Mobilization $t_{-1}$	1.159 [0.053] (0.001)	1.129 [0.061] (0.026)	1.083 [0.031] (0.004)
Non-Radical Mobilization $t_{-1}$	0.959 [0.147] (0.788)	0.710 [0.154] (0.111)	0.896 [0.157] (0.535)
Overt Collective Challenges $t_{-1}$	1.306 [0.051] (0.001)	1.121 [0.047] (0.001)	
Radical Overt Collective Challenges $t_{-1}$			1.263 [0.053] (0.001)
Non-Radical Overt Collective Challenges $t_{-1}$			2.268 [0.738] (0.012)
Prior Repression $t_{-1}$	1.044 [0.023] (0.051)	1.331 [0.013] (0.001)	1.158 [0.031] (0.001)
Spatial Lag of Repression $t_{-1}$	1.094 [0.022] (0.001)	0.987 [0.046] (0.036)	1.105 [0.023] (0.001)
Campaign Activity $t_{-1}$	1.334 [0.023] (0.029)	1.552 [0.318] (0.032)	1.345 [0.178] (0.026)
Population	403.425 [404.724] (0.001)	2861.23 [6381.33] (0.001)	225.002 [229.862] (0.001)
Population Density	0.978 [0.070] (0.762)	0.736 [0.098] (0.022)	0.967 [0.068] (0.738)
Literacy Rate	48.169 [42.078] (0.001)	18338.55 [34007.67] (0.001)	44.005 [37.185] (0.001)
Indigenous Population Rate	4.970 [1.594] (0.001)	43.002 [27.605] (0.001)	5.002 [1.568] (0.001)

Department Violence $t_{-1}$	3.119 [1.464] (0.015)	2.506 [1.395] (0.099)	1.798 [0.445] (0.018)
Country Violence $t_{-1}$	0.937 [0.058] (0.277)	1.160 [0.132] (0.194)	0.945 [0.058] (0.362)
Democracy	0.729 [0.028] (0.001)	0.715 [0.066] (0.001)	0.755 [0.029] (0.001)
Constant	0.000 [0.000] (0.001)	0.000 [0.000] (0.001)	0.000 [0.000] (0.001)
N	2420	2420	2420

Incident Rate Ratio, [Huber-White Standard Error], and (*Two-tailed P-Value*) reported. The Incident Rate Ratio is calculated as the rate of predicted counts of repressive actions when a variable is increased one unit over the rate of predicted counts when that variable is held at zero. All other variables are held at their means.

As can be seen from the results of Models A1 and A2, radical mobilization is strongly and positively associated with increases in both covert and overt repression. This supports the theoretical arguments that in response to mobilization supporting radical redistributions in political power, governments will increase their repression in an attempt to subvert the most costly conflicts. Increases occur in both covert activities such as surveillance, as well as more overt forms of repression such as arrests and torture. Non-radical mobilization, by contrast, was not associated with either category of repression. This is again consistent with the arguments and results presented in the main text.

Table AI also presents Model A3, which replicates the primary analyses while controlling for the radical or non-radical claims around which overt collective challenges are organized. Like the main text analyses, this model utilizes the combined measure of all repressive behavior as its dependent variable. However, in the main text, all forms of overt collective challenges were lumped together into a single indicator. This strategy was used in the primary analyses because it follows from both the core theoretical

predictions of threat response theory and from the conventions developed in the literature. Scholars studying the impact of dissent on repression typically conceive of overt collective challenges as leading to increased repressive behavior without considering the claims around which activists are organizing. And their indicators rarely include any measure of challenger demands.

To see how an investigation into the demands around which overt, collective challenges are organized may impact the primary results of this paper, the replication in Model A3 divides overt collective challenges using the same criteria used to identify radical or non-radical mobilization. As can be seen from the results, this division appears less important for determining when and how repression is deployed in response to overt collective challenges than it is for mobilization. Both radical and non-radical overt collective challenges are significantly and positively correlated with ensuing repression. The same cannot be said for mobilization. Consistent with the primary results, radical mobilization is significantly and positively related to repression, while non-radical mobilization does not.

### *Subsection II: Temporal Effects*

It could be argued that the results are being driven not by state authorities responding to previous revolutionary mobilization, but instead by state authorities responding to ongoing collective challenges. Since mobilization is theorized to increase both levels of collective challenges and repression, and since repression is intricately linked to collective challenges, it may be that the observed correlation between past values of mobilization and contemporaneous measures of repression is spurious.

To guard against this possibility, the results were replicated while including a contemporaneous measure of collective challenges in the model. The results are replicated in Model A4 in in Table AII. In this case contemporaneous overt collective challenges are strongly correlated with repression, while lagged overt collective challenges lose their significance. Results prove that even if we control for ongoing collective action, that the amount of revolutionary mobilization engaged in in the department during the previous month still correlates with a strongly significant and positive increase in the predicated amount of repression committed during the subsequent month.

**Table AII: Robustness Checks Examining the Temporal Sequencing**

	Controlling for Contemporaneous Challenges  (A4)	Excluding Months Jointly Experiencing Mobilization and Challenges  (A5)	“Pre-Conflict”   (A6)
Radical Mobilization $t-1$	1.096 [0.035] (0.006)	1.385 [0.118] 0.001	3.547 [2.188] (0.038)
Non-Radical Mobilization $t-1$	0.8225 [1.179] (0.372)	0.903 [0.285] (0.746)	
Overt Collective Challenges $t-1$	0.967 [0.035] (0.363)	1.246 [0.104] (0.008)	
Overt Collective Challenges $t$	1.628 [0.076] (0.001)		
Prior Repression $t-1$	1.080 [0.025] (0.001)	1.259 [0.092] (0.002)	0.000 [0.000] (0.001)
Spatial Lag of Repression $t-1$	1.073 [0.018]	1.093 [0.027]	1.013 (0.089)

	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.877)
Campaign Activity $t-1$	1.474 [0.166] (0.001)	1.103 [0.189] (0.565)	
Population	112.908 [101.554] (0.001)	127.106 [144.872] (0.001)	1597.34 [6994.32] (0.092)
Population Density	1.017 [0.609] (0.770)	1.026 [0.079] (0.734)	1.624 [0.519] (0.129)
Literacy Rate	18.124 [13.204] (0.001)	21.776 [22.204] (0.002)	.929 [3.597] (0.985)
Indigenous Population Rate	3.652 [0.907] (0.001)	4.398 [1.670] (0.001)	3.888 [5.065] (0.297)
Department Violence $t-1$	1.249 [0.269] (0.341)	2.933 [1.671] (0.059)	0.000 [0.000] (0.001)
Country Violence $t-1$	0.931 [0.043] (0.133)	0.903 [0.076] (0.228)	2.124 [1.034] (0.122)
Democracy	0.755 [0.023] (0.001)	0.720 [0.033] (0.001)	0.677 [0.174] (0.122)
Constant	0.000 [0.000] (0.001)	0.000 [0.000] (0.001)	0.000 [0.000] (0.113)
N	2420	2267	1345

Incident Rate Ratio, [Huber-White Standard Error], and (*Two-tailed P-Value*) reported. The Incident Rate Ratio is calculated as the rate of predicted counts of repressive actions when a variable is increased one unit over the rate of predicted counts when that variable is held at zero. All other variables are held at their means.

Models A5 and A6 in Table II examine these relationships across different subpopulations. All the previous models examined the effects of mobilization on political repression during periods in which there was the potential for mobilization and overt collective challenges to co-occur (as when, for example, mobilization is sustaining overt challenges or when challenges occur in the department in a different place or time). The

alternative specifications are designed to identify the relationship between mobilization and state repression in settings when no overt collective challenges are present. This allows the models to more directly test the theoretical argument that governments use mobilization to anticipate overt collective challenges and direct repression at mobilization in order to undermine challenger behavior.

Model A5 identifies the effects of mobilization on subsequent repression by excluding from the analysis all department-months that jointly experienced both mobilization and overt collective challenges. In this analysis, any potential relationship between lagged measures of radical or non-radical mobilization and ensuing repression are independent from overt collective challenges by construction, as the only periods of mobilization that are examined occur in department-months in which no overt collective challenges were recorded. The results of model A5 again confirm the strong and positive statistical relationship between radical mobilization and incidents of repression.

Model A6 examines whether repression is related to radical mobilization even before the first instances of overt collective challenges emerge. For each department, the model excludes from the analysis the month in which any overt collective challenges were first recorded as well as all subsequent months. While the above analyses examined the waxing and waning of conflict and the development of mobilization and overt collective challenges across the full time period, Model A6 focuses on department-months predating the first observations of overt challenges. As noted above, conflict emerged in Guatemala in different departments at different points of time. By exploiting this variation, it is possible to see how mobilization and repression function prior to the appearance of overt collective challenges.

Table AIII details the month and year in which the first instance of collective challenges was reported in each of Guatemala's 22 departments. This month and each subsequent month through December 1985 were dropped from Model A6.

**Table AIII: Month of First Recorded Collective Challenges**

<u>Department</u>	<u>Month of First Recorded Collective Challenges</u>
Alta Verapaz	May, 1980
Baja Verapaz	March, 1980
Chimaltenango	Feb-79
Chiquimula	Sep-78
El Progreso	Apr-80
El Peten	No Reported CA
El Quiche	Oct-78
Escuintla	Apr-76
Guatemala	May-76
Huehuetenango	Feb-81
Izabal	Aug-79
Jalapa	Jan-84
Jutiapa	May-80
Quetzaltenango	May-80
Retalhuleau	Oct-80
Sacatepequez	Apr-81
San Marcos	Nov-79
Santa Rosa	March, 1980
Solola	May-80
Suchitepequez	Apr-80
Totonicapan	Nov-81
Zacapa	No Reported CA

It is important to note a few things regarding this analysis before proceeding. First, there were no instances of overt collective challenges or electoral campaigns recorded in the department months under review and so these variables were dropped from the analysis. Finally, during the period that precedes the onset of political conflict in each department, there were fewer than a fifty acts of overt repression observed and fewer than two-dozen acts of dissident mobilization. In essence, the period before overt collective challenges is essentially "pre-conflict." As noted, mobilization and overt

challenges ebbed and flowed in the different departments over time, but Model A6 examines the period before the onset of overt challenges.<sup>2</sup> There was less mobilization, less repression, and significantly less variation to leverage. Interestingly, all of the mobilization observed during this time period was radical in nature. Without variation in non-radical mobilization, this variable was dropped from the analysis.

Interestingly, when department-months jointly experiencing both mobilization and overt collective challenges are excluded from the analysis in Models A6, the observed relationship between radical mobilization and ensuing repressive behavior becomes even more pronounced. In this case, following radical dissident mobilization, repression is predicted to increase more than three fold.<sup>3</sup>

### *Subsection III: Alternative Fixed Effects Methodologies*

The choice of a FE estimator within a negative binomial framework is not trivial. Applied statisticians have devoted considerable attention to debating the matter over the past few decades. Following the explosion of MLE models in applied work, statisticians were fearful that the incorporation of FE within such an approach could lead to biased results occurring because of the incidental parameter problem. This led to the development of so called “conditional FE models,” which incorporated the FE terms into the modeling strategy. Such an approach was initially demonstrated to produce consistent coefficient estimates (see Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984). However, concerns emerged that this approach was that it was not in fact a true FE method in that it did not

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<sup>2</sup> Every instance of repression remaining in the sample was predated by at least one act of mobilization.

<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, care should be taken when interpreting the results of this model as the magnitude of this is influenced by the fact that repression was applied (on average) at a far lower rate during these initial periods.

control for all stable covariates (it was thus possible to incorporate time [or space] invariant covariates within the analysis and still estimate the model). Guimaraes (2008), for example, demonstrates the conditional FE models' limited ability to control for individual Fixed Effects, except under very specific assumptions. Partly in response to such critique, Allison and Waterman (2002) engage in a simulation study in which they demonstrate that the initial concern for the incidental parameters problem was over stated and that unconditional FE models (i.e., those incorporating dummy variables for the spatial or temporal units of interests) did not yield inconsistent coefficient estimates.

Following from this debate, the decision was made to analyze the data using the more traditional, unconditional (i.e. dummy variable) approach in the primary text because (1) it is a true Fixed Effects method and (2) there is evidence that this form of analysis should not produce bias in the coefficients resulting from the incidental parameters problem. This approach controls for the potential for any unobserved department-specific factors or secular time trends to confound the results.

In this subsection, the study compares the results to replications using the conditional approach and the hybrid approach specified in Allison (2005). Allison's hybrid FE model involves subtracting the mean from all of the relevant independent variables (to difference out the time (or space) invariant characteristics correlated with the independent variables) and then including a random effects parameter to account for any remaining unobserved heterogeneity in the distribution of the dependent variable.

The results of these analyses can be found in Table AIV. Models A7 and A9 incorporate conditional departmental and temporal fixed effects, respectively. Models A8 and A10 are estimated using the hybrid FE approach.

**Table AIV: Alternative Fixed Effects Strategies**

	Radical and Non-Radical Mobilization				
	(A7)	(A8)	(A9)	(A10)	(A11) (OLS)
Radical Mobilization $t-1$	1.023 [0.012] (0.054)	1.023 [0.010] (0.024)	1.023 [0.012] (0.054)	1.089 [0.025] (0.001)	0.044 [0.006] (0.001)
Non-Radical Mobilization $t-1$	0.948 [0.068] (0.457)	0.949 [0.051] (0.338)	0.948 [0.068] (0.457)	1.036 [0.149] (0.809)	0.067 [0.054] (0.234)
Overt Collective Challenges $t-1$	1.096 [0.020] (0.001)	1.139 [0.013] (0.001)	1.096 [0.020] (0.001)	0.997 [0.035] (0.940)	0.052 [0.012] (0.001)
Prior Repression $t-1$	1.005 [0.010] (0.631)	1.021 [0.008] (0.010)	1.005 [0.010] (0.631)	1.006 [0.022] (0.787)	0.037 [0.006] (0.001)
Spatial Lag of Repression $t-1$	1.084 [0.016] (0.001)	1.003 [0.013] (0.778)	1.084 [0.016] (0.001)	1.106 [0.021] (0.001)	0.015 [0.010] (0.174)
Campaign Activity $t-1$	1.855 [0.020] (0.001)	1.170 [0.947] (0.052)	1.855 [0.020] (0.001)	1.419 [0.192] (0.011)	0.009 [0.047] (0.837)
Population		3915.42 [3579.69] (0.001)		1008937 [1223025] (0.001)	
Population Density		1.617 [0.167] (0.001)		0.948 [0.097] (0.608)	
Literacy Rate		2304.06 [1749.17] (0.001)		8935.99 [8645.81] (0.001)	
Indigenous Population Rate		14.248 [3.604] (0.001)		8.528 [2.801] (0.001)	
Department Violence $t-1$	1.140 [0.196] (0.447)	0.970 [0.143] (0.839)	1.140 [0.196] (0.447)	3.930 [1.004] (0.001)	0.265 [0.104] (0.019)
Country Violence $t-1$	1.127		1.127		

	[0.045] (0.003)		[0.045] (0.003)		
Democracy	0.756 [0.023] (0.001)		0.756 [0.023] (0.001)		
Constant	0.058 [0.011] (0.001)	0.000 [0.000] (0.001)	0.058 [0.011] (0.001)	0.127 [0.012] (0.001)	0.000 [0.000] (0.001)
Conditional Department FE	Y				
Hybrid Department FE		Y			
Conditional Month FE			Y		
Hybrid Month FE				Y	
Department and Monthly FE					Y
N	2420	2420	2420	2420	2420

Incident Rate Ratio, [Huber-White Standard Error], and (*Two-tailed P-Value*) reported. The Incident Rate Ratio is calculated as the rate of predicted counts of repressive actions when a variable is increased one unit over the rate of predicted counts when that variable is held at zero. All other variables are held at their means.

As can be seen from the results presented in the table, the robustness of the study's principal results were not substantively affected by the choice of fixed effects estimator. The statistical significance of radical mobilization edges just over the .05 threshold in Model A7, but is in the predicted direction. We can thus say with a reasonable degree of confidence even in this case that radical mobilization is associated with increased repression.

The additional models presented support this contention. Across both hybrid FE approaches and the Conditional Month FE, radical mobilization is significantly and positively related to increased repression. Taken with the results presented in the primary text, this evidence strongly suggests that there are no unobservable factors located on either the spatial or temporal dimension that are biasing the results.

One further alternative would be to include both temporal and departmental fixed-effects. To do so, Model A11 in Table AIV log-transforms the data on political repression as the count value +1 and then estimates the relationship between that variable and mobilization using OLS (with robust standard errors). Employing this so-called “two-way fixed-effects” strategy does not substantively impact the results. Once again radical mobilization is correlated with significant increases in political repression, while non-radical mobilization is not.

#### *Subsection IV: Instrumental Variables*

This subsection tests the robustness of the findings to an instrumental variables (IV) approach. The IV design is formulated to probe the causality at work in the previously identified relationship between mobilization and repression. Like most social phenomena, mobilization occurs non-randomly. To the extent that the selection processes associated with decisions to engage in mobilization are related to the expected behavior of governments, then correlations between repression and dissident behavior may yield misleading conclusions.

To generate unbiased causal estimates of mobilization’s effect on repression, one must be able to identify exogenous variation in mobilization. One method for doing so is instrumental variables regression (see Angrist and Pischke 2009; Dunning 2012). IV regression first identifies seemingly exogenous variation in mobilization brought about by variation in some plausibly exogenous instruments and then examine how that variation relates to measures of repression. For the models to successfully identify exogenous effects, the core criteria for a valid design require that (1) the instrument impact variation in the independent variables of interests (the relevance criterion) and (2)

and that the instrument only influences the dependent variable through its impact on the endogenous treatment (the exclusion restriction).

The analyses below exploit the temporal disaggregation of the data used in this study to identify these first stage instruments. One variable known to impact decisions to engage in mobilization, and thus satisfy the relevance criterion, is past values of repression (e.g., Davenport et al. 2005). Indeed, consistent with the arguments articulated in the main text, one of the primary reasons for committing repression is to influence decisions to mobilize. However, one may be concerned that this variable is unlikely to meet the exclusion restriction. Repressive institutions are often argued to be persistent and past values of repression have been demonstrated to influence contemporaneous values of repression (e.g., Davenport 1996).

Following a procedure common in labor economics (e.g., Porterba 1991) and recently expropriated to study counter-insurgent violence (e.g., Kocher et al. 2011), it is possible to use past variables of the dependent variable as an instrument without violating the exclusion restriction. The procedure works by utilizing values of repression measured in the more distant past (i.e., repression measured at  $t-2$ ,  $t-3$ ) as exogenous instruments predicting mobilization in the first stage equations, while also including intermediate values of repression (i.e., repression measured at  $t-1$ ) as a control in the second stage equation. Including the intermediate values of repression in the second stage breaks apart the temporal link between the instruments and the dependent variable and provides conditional independence between the instruments and the error term. For selection effects to persist, there would have to be an artifact influencing conflict processes during

the more distant periods (t-2, t-3) and the contemporaneous period (t), but not influencing the intermediate period (t-1) employed as a control variable.

As before, the primary independent variable of interest is mobilization. However, in this case, we are examining only that variation in radical and non-radical mobilization that is (1) influenced by values of repression in the more distant past and (2) uncorrelated with repression measured in the more intermediate past.

**Table AV: Instrumental Variables Equations**

	(A12a) First Stage - Radical Mobilization <sub>t-1</sub>	(A12b) First Stage - Non-Radical Mobilization <sub>t-1</sub>	(A12c) Second Stage - Repression <sub>t</sub>
Radical Mobilization <sub>t-1</sub>			1.089 [0.296] (0.001)
Non-Radical Mobilization <sub>t-1</sub>			2.145 [1.931] (0.267)
Overt Collective Challenges <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.188 [0.076] (0.014)	-0.338 [0.123] (0.009)	0.472 [0.143] (0.001)
Prior Repression <sub>t-1</sub>	0.122 [0.081] (0.131)	0.038 [0.019] (0.041)	1.022 [0.013] (0.137)
Spatial Lag of Repression <sub>t-1</sub>	0.009 [0.021] (0.437)	-0.001 [0.003] (0.637)	-0.003 [0.026] (0.896)
Campaign Activity <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.264 [0.101] (0.010)	-0.017 [0.043] (0.681)	0.344 [0.233] (0.141)
Population	-0.290 [0.373] (0.436)	-0.022 [0.113] (0.844)	2.581 [0.922] (0.005)
Population Density	-0.001 [0.008] (0.877)	0.001 [0.002] (0.467)	-0.005 [0.020] (0.798)

Literacy Rate	-0.178 [0.254] (0.038)	-0.029 [0.074] (0.690)	1.502 [0.592] (0.011)
Indigenous Population Rate	-0.084 [0.079] (0.284)	-0.033 [0.022] (0.129)	0.444 [0.168] (0.008)
Department Violence $t_{-1}$	-0.624 [0.191] (0.001)	-0.062 [0.039] (0.122)	1.082 [0.563] (0.055)
Country Violence $t_{-1}$	0.025 [0.038] (0.511)	-0.020 [0.011] (0.076)	-0.070 [0.108] (0.516)
Democracy	0.065 [0.015] (0.001)	0.005 [0.003] (0.157)	-0.109 [0.050] (0.031)
Constant	0.986 [0.969] (0.309)	0.102 [0.294] (0.730)	-6.902 [2.414] (0.004)
Prior Repression $t_{-2}$	0.316 [0.057] (0.001)	0.049 [0.013] (0.001)	
Prior Repression $t_{-3}$	0.054 [0.042] (0.206)	0.006 [0.011] (0.584)	
F-Statistic of Joint Significance of the Instruments	18.24 (0.001)	9.35 (0.001)	
N	2178	2178	2178

Coefficient, [Huber-White Standard Error], and (*Two-tailed P-Value*) reported.

Results from IV estimations provide further evidence supporting the contention that governments engage in increased political repression following radical mobilization. Evidence from the first stage models (A12a and A12b) strongly affirms the relevance of the instruments. The F-Statistics for the joint significance of the instruments was highly significant in both first stage models. Interestingly, the models predict a positive short-term relationship between past values of repression and mobilization in the first stage

results. This evidence is consistent with the more general finding in the literature on repression, which finds that while governments employ repression to suppress challenges, the impact of repression is often mixed or counter productive (e.g., Davenport et al. 2005).<sup>4</sup>

There is also evidence that the exclusion restriction is met. One cannot directly test the operation of the exclusion restriction in any IV model (Dunning 2013). But Sargan-Hansen tests of overidentification are often used to examine the potential for statistical endogeneity to influence the results. These tests examine the correlation between the instruments and the second stage residuals. Overidentification tests cannot be run on models, such as the above results, in which the number of instruments exactly matches the number of endogenous repressors. But it is possible to replicate the above results using the two instruments and only one endogenous repressor (i.e., radical *or* non-radical mobilization) and examine the Sargan-Hansen J-Statistics for both of those models. In both cases, the p-value of the statistic fell well outside the boundaries conventionally employed to diagnose statistical endogeneity. For Radical Mobilization, the J-Statistic was 1.098, with  $p < 0.294$ . For Non-Radical Mobilization it was 0.987, with  $p < 0.323$ . All of evidence supports the use of these two instruments to identify relevant and conditionally exogenous variation in mobilization.

Turning to the second stage model (A12c), the analysis presents results estimating whether seemingly exogenous variation in radical and non-radical mobilization is significantly related to subsequent counts of repressive activities. From the analysis, radical mobilizing activities again appear to be strong and robust predictors of repressive

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<sup>4</sup> In a more extensive analysis that was developed as a follow up to this paper, I demonstrate that over the long-term, repression targeting mobilization has a strong negative effect on subsequent challenges.

action. This confirms that states do not simply act to repress their population in response to preexisting collective action, but also commit repressive action targeting early mobilization attempts supporting radical redistributions of political power. Non-radical mobilization is once again not significantly related to repression.

#### *Subsection V: Vector Error Corrected Models*

A final robustness check employed is to estimate the integrated effects of dissent and repression. If states are anticipating dissident behavior in real time then modeling the effects of lagged dissent alone will not accurately capture this process (Moore 1995; Shellman 2006; Carey 2006). To check the robustness of the findings to a model in which governments are forward looking in their application of repression, the second robustness check employs a form of dynamic time-series analysis known as vector-error corrected (VEC) models.

For the time-series models, the spatial components of the data are ignored but the temporal components remain disaggregated into monthly event counts. VEC models are similar to vector auto-regressive models (VAR) often used to study dynamic interactions between repression and dissent (e.g., Shellman 2006). But where VAR models are retrospective in orientation, such that repression and dissent variables respond to past values of one another, VEC models have a more prospective structure. In VEC models, repression and dissent are expected to converge into a long term stationary equilibrium as dissidents and state forces learn to anticipate one another's behavior and choose their actions accordingly (Reeves et al. 2011). In other words, the VEC models allow the two

variables to respond stochastically to one another while predicting that they will converge into a stable relationship over time (Johansen 1995).

VEC models use maximum-likelihood techniques to estimate the cointegration of two or more variables with short-run dynamic properties and a long-run equilibrium (Johansen 1995). In expectation, the two variables are cointegrated such that they should jointly produce a stationary time series. These models are used when two time series X and Y follow different random walks in the short run, but are cointegrated series in the long run. A series Z is cointegrated if both series X and Y become stationary after differencing the series by the same order d, such that  $Y_t - Y_{t-d}$  makes both series stationary.

VEC regression produces parameters for three separate equations: a cointegration equation and two equations estimating repression and dissent. If states and dissidents employ prospective decision-making and anticipate one another's behavior before deciding when and where to act, then they can be expected to share a long-run stationary relationship. Evidence of cointegration suggests that the two variables anticipate one another and converge in the future. In the case of repression and dissent such evidence suggests that states and dissidents are anticipating one another's behavior and reacting to how they expect the other to behave.

**Table AVI: VEC Cointegration Equations for Repression and Mobilization**

	(A13)	(A14)
Repressive Action	1.0	1.0
Mobilization	-3.565 [0.387] (0.001)	
Radical Mobilization		-4.082 [0.468] (0.001)

Coefficient, [Huber-White Standard Error], and (*Two-tailed P-Value*) reported. All models run with constants—constants omitted from presentation.

Table AVI displays the results from the cointegration equations of two VEC regressions.<sup>5</sup> Negative and statistically significant parameters indicate that the two actors are anticipating one another’s behavior and adapting their own accordingly.<sup>6</sup> Interestingly, both models displayed in Table AVI show evidence of cointegration and suggest that the government is thinking prospectively and anticipating dissident actions when deciding when and where to commit repression. The evidence suggests that over time the state learned to anticipate mobilization and engaged in repressive action to counter such behavior.

<sup>5</sup> Each model estimated the mutual effects of repressive action and dissident mobilization or radical mobilization using a first and second order lag, as suggested by the Dickie-Fuller (DF) method (Enders 2004). Stationarity was achieved with an auto-regressive model employing first and second order temporal lags of repression and no moving average components.


<sup>6</sup> As Reeves et al. (2011, 17) point out, “The sign will be negative because the constant has a positive sign. If the series have a cointegrated relationship, they should have opposite signs.”

## Section 2: Substantive Effects

The above discussion identifies the significant relationship between mobilization and increased political repression. A single mobilizing activity is predicted in Model 1 of the main text to increase the amount of repression in the department during the next month by around 13%. Similarly, single radical mobilization event is predicted to increase repression 14% in Model 4 main text. These statistics provide the average effect, which is substantial when one considers that, in sites radical mobilization occurred, three radical mobilization events were observed on average. As noted in the primary text, on average an increase of three acts of radical mobilization is predicted to lead to one additional act of repression.

But it is also interesting to explore the relationship between the mobilization, repression, and a host of relevant contextual factors. Figure AI presents a series of graphs predicting repression as a function of increases in radical mobilization as well as several important contextual factors. Each of these graphs presents clues for understanding the factors that may impact the relationship between radical mobilization and repression, which can help contextualize the generalizability of the findings and yield clues for future research. The graphs were generated using the predictions generated by Model IV in the primary text. For each panel, the 95% confidence intervals are provided along with the estimate. Except for radical mobilization and the particular contextual covariate of interest in each panel, all variables are held at their mean values.

**Figure A1: The Predicted Effects of Radical Mobilization on Repression**



The first panel presents the average prediction for repression resulting in areas where overt collective challenges are and are not occurring.<sup>7</sup> Here, one can observe that while repression escalates more quickly in sites where overt collective challenges are ongoing, repression is expected to increase in response to radical mobilization even when no challenges are observed. In areas where no overt collective action was ongoing, two radical mobilization events are associated with one act of repression. That rate doubles in sites where both radical mobilization and overt collective challenges occur, though the confidence intervals of the two sets of estimates overlap. The second panel presents a comparison between areas of high and low state capacity.<sup>8</sup> The figure makes it clear that repression is aided by state capacity. In areas of high state capacity, repression increases in response to mobilization nearly three times as fast as in areas of low capacity. Finally, the third panel presents a comparison between highly autocratic and semi-democratic regimes.<sup>9</sup> Here one can see that while semi-democracies can be expected to increase repression in response to radical mobilization, that effect is substantially muted when compared to the escalation of repression predicted in autocratic regimes.

These estimations provide can provide clues into the generalizability of the relationship between radical mobilization and increases in repression. One needs to consider that these predicted relationships are contingent on the same underlying data used to estimate the primary results. True tests for the generalizability of the relationship will need to examine new data under diverse sets of contexts. But they suggest that the relationship between radical mobilization and increases in repression is likely to be

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<sup>7</sup> The comparison is between areas where no overt collective challenges were occurring and areas where 2.95 challenges occurred. This is the mean number of challenges that took place in department-months where challenges were present.

<sup>8</sup> The comparison is between areas one standard deviation above and below the average literacy rate.

<sup>9</sup> The comparison is between the historical minimum (-8) and historical maximum (-3.5) X-Polity scores.

strongest in high capacity autocratic regimes. Where state capacity is weaker, governments may have more trouble identifying mobilization behaviors or targeting organizers. And where democratic institutions are present, governments may be more constrained in their ability to deploy coercion.

### Section 3: Data Sources

This section discusses the different sources of data used in the study with regards to both the types of events recorded by source and the spatial and temporal patterns of activity. Contributing to the main text’s discussion of patterns of bias in news paper reporting, the section concludes with a presentation of case material on specific types of newspaper bias in Guatemala.

Table AVII reports the types of events recorded by type of activity and source.

**Table AVII: Events Recorded by Type and Source**

Type of Event	AHPN	Newspapers
<b>Unknown</b>	1	
<b>Other</b>		
<b>Accident</b>		3
<b>Verbal Harassment/Written Harassment/Death Threat</b>	20	129
<b>Warning</b>	2	54
<b>Indiscriminate violence /Massacre</b>	169	88
<b>Targeted Attacks/Killings—Political or Military Target:</b>	572	289
<b>Targeted Attacks/Killings—Racial or Sectarian Target</b>	3	24
<b>Brawl/Clash</b>		
<b>Battle</b>	209	226
<b>Riot/Mob violence/Looting</b>	5	1
<b>Debate/verbal argument/Non-violent confrontation</b>		11
<b>Political March</b>	17	184
<b>Racial/Sectarian March</b>	1	
<b>Vigil</b>		
<b>Speech</b>	16	172
<b>Strike/Picket</b>	13	122
<b>Public gathering/Meeting</b>	40	28
<b>Ceremony/Symbolic display by Government</b>		5
<b>Ceremony/Symbolic display by protestors/dissidents</b>		5
<b>Funeral Procession</b>		1
<b>Information distribution</b>	423	266
<b>Hunger strike</b>		
<b>Civil Disobedience/Barricades</b>	4	148
<b>Protest Ban</b>		
<b>Counter-protest</b>		
<b>Complaint filing/Seeking legal advice</b>	2	2
<b>National Policy Change</b>	1	24
<b>Local Level Policy Change</b>		1
<b>End of Ceasefire</b>		

Ceasefire/Peace talks/negotiations/international negotiations	2	5
Release of hostages/prisoners	1	13
Campaign Behavior	116	12
Selective Arrest/Attempted Arrest	208	153
Non-Selective Arrest/Non-Selective Attempted Arrest	4	1
Mass Arrest		5
Informed/cooperated with Police/Military or Asked to inform/cooperate with Police/Military	4	2
Joint Military/Police Operations	5	
Police (or Army) Road Block/Checkpoint/Patrol	25	25
Police Search	28	13
Police curfew		
Chase/Police Chase	2	
State Surveillance	890	3
Police Abuse during detention/arrest	1	2
Protest Policing/Riot policing- No Live Rounds	8	15
Protest Policing—Live Rounds		343
Other forms of state repression	1	
Intra-communal violence/social control		5
Turf war/Territorial dispute		
Gang violence		
Ethnic derogation/Ethnic violence		1
Intra-organizational violence/internal policing		2
Torture, mental or physical	1	6
Beating	1	6
Suicide/Attempted Suicide	1	
Hijacking/Kidnapping	154	118
Rape/Sexual Assault/Sexual Harassment		
Raid/Siege	50	50
Robbery	56	3
Provocation by Victim	3	3
Provocation by Perpetrator		1
Arms Purchased by Insurgent, or Insurgent Friends/Kin	38	
Arms Purchase by State, or State Friends/Kin	1	3
Victim Taken to Hospital/Doctor	21	
Public Sympathy for Victim		2
Ethnic Migration	4	1
Public Sympathy of Perpetrator		1
Forcibly Evicted		39
Non-Violent Trauma		
Initiate an investigation	216	10
Secure a perimeter		
Combat training	8	
Inform superiors	1,774	1

<b>Legal procedures/trial</b>	7	11
<b>Solicited international actions</b>	26	7
<b>“Non-violent mobilization”</b>	413	6
<b>“Violent mobilization”</b>	4	22
<b>Formation of an armed group</b>	6	3
<b>Terrorism</b>	471	102
<b>Membership in insurgent organizations/Contributing to the insurgency</b>	427	10
<b>Clandestine Meeting</b>	45	
<b>Membership in a social movement organization/contributing to a social movement organization</b>	15	23
<b>Violent Trauma</b>	206	
<b>Pre-emptive Security Measures</b>	165	40
<b>Subject Dissapeared/kidnapped</b>	158	27
<b>Subject murdered</b>	50	
<b>Inform inferiors/rank and file</b>	5	
<b>Planning Violent Actions</b>	49	1
<b>Defection to Army – No Amnesty</b>	3	
<b>Defection to Army – Amnesty</b>	33	5
<b>Return of Refugees</b>	3	4
<b>Refugees flee across border</b>		30
<b>Possession of illegal literature</b>	5	
<b>Total</b>	7212	2918

Both the AHPN and the newspapers appear highly interested in identifying acts of overt collective challenges, which makes up more nearly 50% of the dissident events recorded by the AHPN and more than 90% of the dissident events recorded by the press. However, the AHPN still records more than 300 more acts of overt collective challenges than the newspapers. Comparing the identification of mobilization activities between the two sources reveals even starker differences. More than 20% of the AHPN records (more than 750 individual events) identified mobilizing activities by the dissidents. Newspapers showed far less interest in recording these actions and documented fewer than 100 of them.

With regards to the identified repressive activities in each source, covert repressive actions feature much more prominently in the AHPN data. In terms of sheer numbers, the two sources report similar quantities of overt repressive actions (772 in the AHPN, 660 in

the newspapers), but covert repressive actions are recorded with much greater frequency in the AHPN data. More than 3,000 covert repressive actions are identified in the AHPN data, compared to fewer than 30 in the newspaper data.

**Table AVIII: Summary Statistics of Key Variables**

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Radical Mobilization (AHPN)	2662	0.250	1.486	0	29
Non- Radical Mobilization (AHPN)	2662	0.032	0.277	0	6
Overt Collective Challenges (AHPN)	2662	0.550	1.871	0	29
Repression (AHPN)	2662	0.869	3.178	0	52
Radical Mobilization (News)	2662	0.023	0.168	0	2
Non- Radical Mobilization (News)	2662	0.004	0.069	0	1
Overt Collective Challenges (News)	2662	0.462	1.849	0	38
Repression (News)	2662	0.053	0.339	0	5
Campaign Activity	2662	0.031	0.253	0	5
Democracy	2662	-0.044	1.160	-2.225	0.889
% Indigenous	2662	0.464	0.314	0.014	0.977
% Literate	2662	0.391	0.120	0.141	0.595
Population	2662	9.228	0.489	8.205	10.310
Population Density	2662	0.004	0.004	0.000	0.018
Poverty	2662	0.363	0.481	0	1
Department	2662	0.026	0.158	0	1
Violence					

Table AVIII presents summary statistics for the primary variables used in the analyses. In this case the event categories have been collapsed down to the department-month in which they occurred, and the Table presents values in terms of these 2662 units. From the Table, it can be seen that when looking at aggregate categories, the AHPN data


again present better coverage than the newspaper data. This is particularly true for the more covert mobilization activities, but is also the case for repressive actions. But as discussed above, when looking at the behaviors of overt collective challenges, the two sources become more comparable in terms of their coverage.

The Table also demonstrates the relative number of radical and non-radical mobilization activities captured in both sets of data. Both the AHPN and the newspaper data record a greater number of radical mobilization activities, but the figure is most apparent for the AHPN data. Here we see that more than 80% of mobilization activities recorded by the AHPN surrounded radical claims making, which is consistent with the theoretical expectation that coercive bureaucracies are overwhelmingly concerned with directing repression at the mobilization efforts that surround this type of contention.

*Subsection II: Temporal and Geographic Coverage by Source*

Figure AII displays monthly counts of political activity (the sum of incidents of overt and covert repression, mobilization and collective action) by month and data source.

**Figure AII: Time Series of Political Activity by Source**



Newspaper coverage appears to be temporally over-distributed in the first five years of the conflict. Following consistent coverage during the early years there is a sharp drop off in coverage beginning in the beginning of 1981. The AHPN records take almost the exact opposite distribution. For the first five years under review, coverage appears episodic. Then beginning at the same time as the rapid decline in newspaper coverage there is a rapid uptick in the number of events recorded by the AHPN. From 1981 through 1985 coverage by the AHPN remains high, while there is very little political activity reported in the press.

These two shifts (the decline in newspaper coverage and the increase in AHPN coverage that took place in early 1981) correspond with trends identified in repressive activity identified by the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH 1998), an alternative truth and reconciliation effort organized by the Catholic Church (Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999) and by a NGO study of human rights abuses in the country (Ball et al. 1999). The rapid escalation of political repression documented by outside sources corresponds closely to both the increase repressive activity recorded by the AHPN and the decrease in similar activity recorded by the newspapers. The drop off in newspaper records is likely related to the intensification of attacks on the press (Brocket 2005; Guberek 2012). At least 42 Guatemalan journalists were murdered or disappeared between 1977 and 1981, while another 49 were killed between 1981 and 1982 (Garrard-Burnett 2011; Ball et al. 1999). Many more fled the country out of fear of persecution (Garrard-Burnett 2011). The censorship of the press was solidified through a state of siege instituted in 1982 that suspended civil liberties, curtailed freedom of the press and prohibited divulging news of political violence. Just as repressive action was beginning to take off, newspaper reports become almost nonexistent.<sup>10</sup>

An interesting question concerns whether the differences in reporting by time period across the two datasets influences the results found in this study. One might wonder, for example, whether the divergent findings resulting from the analysis of the news data and the AHPN data reflect different repression and dissent dynamics operating

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<sup>10</sup> Limitations in Guatemalan press coverage resulted from more than just censorship however. In many cases the government was able to guarantee favorable coverage by bribing *faferos*. As Garrard-Burnett (2011, 164) notes, *faferos* were “poorly paid reporters and employees who accepted money in exchange for publishing articles favorable to the government and for suppressing negative news in their news outlet.” *Fafero* translates roughly to “halfies—half to the reporter, half to the editor” (ibid.).


during different phases of the conflict. If one assumes that reporting in the two data sources is equally valid and that the two simply capture behavior at two different time points, then there is an interesting pattern to be revealed in the analysis. During the early years of the conflict, state repression is not significantly related to mobilization. The preemptive repression of mobilization does not occur until after the state and dissidents have engaged in some initial sparring and the state has had time to build up its security apparatus. During the earlier years, which are most effectively captured by the media, the state is repressive, but only following collective action, not following mobilization. During the later years, as the states repressive capacity increases, we see repression of mobilization as well as the repression of collective action.

Another way of interpreting the divergence of findings as a function of reporting over time is to question the assumption that the reporting of political repression is equally valid across sources. As noted in the text, existing research on reporting patterns in the media leads to questions regarding the capacity or interest of news organizations to report the types of preemptive repressive behavior this study is most interested in. Here, the divergent results found across the two news sources occur because the repression of mobilization is not recorded by the media during the earlier or later time periods.

One way of deciphering which of these interpretations is more plausible is to compare the temporal distributions to existing data on repressive behavior in Guatemala. Ball, Kobrak and Spierer (1999) engaged in what is likely the most extensive collection of quantitative data on state killings in Guatemala completed to date. Compiled across multiple data sources, including the media, human rights reports and survivor interviews, the Ball et al. study provides unique insight into when killings were perpetrated in the

country. Figure AIII reproduces their table 1.1, which reports their principle findings on the temporal distributions of state killings in the country from 1960-1996.

**Figure AIII: Ball et al. (1999) Findings on State Killings in Guatemala 1960-1996**



As can be seen from the figure, state killings remained relatively low and comparatively constant from 1975-1979. During this year, there is a sharp increase. Comparing the figure to Figure AIII above we see that this pattern is to some extent captured in the media data, lending credibility to the argument that at least during the initial period of the conflict the media data did a reasonable job reflecting patterns of political behavior in the country.<sup>11</sup> However, if the Ball et al. data can be taken as a reliable indicator for what repression actually looked like during this period, the uptick in repression reported in the newspapers through 1979 and into 1980 is not nearly as sharp

<sup>11</sup> Of course such data are imprecise and refer only to reported counts, not to the description biases referenced in the main text.

as it should be. When we compare general trends for the AHPN data during this time, the patterns appear more consistent with the increase in repressive behavior beginning just before 1979 and continuing through 1980 and 1981. One way of interpreting such evidence is that the AHPN data and the newspaper data are not doing an equally good job at capturing repressive behavior at two different time periods, but that the AHPN data do a better job of reflecting patterns of political repression across the entire period of interest. This leads to questions regarding how repression was reported in the paper and whether we can actually infer from media data any knowledge regarding what patterns of repression looked like in actuality. Still, it is hard to draw firm conclusions without a more qualitative investigation of how repression might have varied across the decade under review. This is the topic of future research.

**Figure AIV: Spatial Distribution of Political Activity by Source**




Figure AIV displays the distribution of incidents of political activity identified in the two datasets based by source and Guatemalan department. Examining the spatial distribution of the data across Guatemala’s departments, both the AHPN and the newspapers recorded the highest number of event in the capital department of Guatemala. Beyond that, there appears to be better spatial representation by the AHPN data, which records more events than the newspapers in 15 of the 22 departments. Most notably, the AHPN does a better job recording violence in departments such as Quiche, which

experienced the worst reported acts of state repression and dissident violence during the war (CEH 1998). The AHPN also captures appreciably more events in Peten, which has been identified principal mobilizing site for the insurgency (Stohl 1993). One of the reasons why violence was so allegedly severe in Quiche and why the dissidents apparently mobilized in Peten is because these departments are areas with high elevation, dense jungle and sparse population settlements. Such evidence is consistent with arguments predicting undercounts of political activity from the newspapers in places far from urban settings with little state presence. All of this suggests that analysis of the AHPN data should provide a more representative assessment of political conflict in Guatemala.

#### **Section 4: Revisiting the Distinction between Mobilization and Overt, Collective Challenge**

This section discusses a number of important points regarding the study's theoretical division between overt collective challenges and more covert mobilization activities. This division is meaningful both for considerations of how dissent is organized and for how governments reflect on various actions in their considerations for employing repression. As stressed in the primary text, overt collective challenges are those actions publically expressing collective demands at target authorities. By their nature, these actions are designed to demonstrate information to the government on the demands, strength, and resolve of a dissident movement. They are, in this consideration, nearly always publically observable to government authorities. Mobilization activities, by contrast, are typically clandestine. Such actions are inwardly focused on organizational development and fundraising. Even if actions such as information distribution take place in public spaces, mobilizers seeking to develop organizations to challenge the government can be expected to carry out such actions in spaces where they are less easily observed by authorities. And, as argued in the text, governments are aware of this pattern of behavior. In an effort to identify (and disrupt) the most threatening forms of mobilization, governments develop rich surveillance apparatuses to collect information on clandestine mobilization activities through the use of spies, civilian informants, and covert observation.

Consistent with the arguments presented in the primary text, both Radical and Non-Radical Mobilization are related to significantly ( $p < 0.01$ ) increased rates of overt collective challenges, though the relationship is substantively stronger for Non-radical Mobilization. Non-Radical mobilization correlates with more than a 90% increase in the

rate of OCC the next month, while Radical Mobilization correlates with just under have that rate of increase. This evidence is consistent with the argument made in the paper, which contend that mobilization should increase OCC, so governments target radical mobilization to stave off overt contention surrounding those issues. However, the evidence is inconsistent with a plausible alternative in which the regime is principally concerned with managing OCC and categorizes demands as radical in order to direct repression where they perceived the risks for OCC to be highest.

Another important statistic discussed relates to the distribution of violence between areas experiencing Radical and Non-Radical Mobilization. If Radical Mobilization is related to tactical selection in that same department-month, then repression against mobilization in these departments could be related to state efforts to control the most dangerous Overt, Collective Challenges, rather than Radical Mobilization. However, when we look at the relationship between different forms of mobilization and the use of violence, the pattern is inconsistent with this alternative explanation. Indeed, tactical selection appears unrelated to demands. Both radical and non-radical mobilization are related to increased violent activity by non-state groups ( $p > 0.01$  level). But as above, the substantive effect appears stronger for non-radical mobilization than for radical mobilization. Non-radical mobilization is related to a 66% increase in the predicted number of violent challenger actions, while radical mobilization is related to a 35% increase.

A final question that can be raised in this section is how the division of repression targeting mobilization and overt collective challenges relates to a commonly made in the civil war literature on the distinction between discriminate and indiscriminate violence.

As commonly articulated, discriminate violence is tied directly to an anticipation or response to specific behaviors. At the most discriminate end of this spectrum lies actions tied to individual level behavior, such as defecting to the other side (e.g., Kalyvas 2006). Less discriminate violence selects its victims based on behaviors measured at more aggregate levels, such as ethnic groups or territorial locations (e.g., Steele 2009), while truly indiscriminate violence is deployed seemingly at random (e.g., Lyall 2009). What is interesting about the data I collected in Guatemala is that there were very few incidents of repression (fewer than 50) for which there was no connected or related act of non-state behavior at either the individual or group level. This fact provides some thought-provoking insight into when, how, and why repression is applied, particularly when one considers commonly articulated arguments regarding Guatemala as a rare instance of “effective” indiscriminate violence (e.g., Stoll 1993).

The evidence suggests that, at least as witnessed from the perspective of the state, effort was made to direct both overt and covert forms of repression at a minimum at specific groups, if not individuals. Another interesting question is how the target selection is viewed from the perspective of third party civilians. If the civilians learn of the repression and believe that it occurred because of direct involvement in particular forms of dissident behavior, it may be viewed as discriminate (and thus it is likely to function as a deterrent). However, if civilians see the repression as unrelated to any direct challenge to the state, they are more likely to see the targeting as removed from any individual behaviors. In thus settings, repression is likely to be viewed as indiscriminate and has a higher likelihood of inciting a backlash mobilization. This summarizes some of the potential tradeoff costs governments face as they consider directing repression at

mobilization. As argued in the text, because the expected costs of conflict over radical demands can be predicted to be substantially higher, governments become more willing to accept the potential costs of repression targeting mobilization in sites where mobilization supports radical ideals.

## Section 5: Sampling and Coding Procedures

To generate an events database of political activity from 10 million documents recorded in the AHPN, a multi-stage sampling procedure was carried out. First, I conducted a pilot study of the police archive in March 2010. Given the vast trove of documents, it would be impossible to read the full collection (compare Guzman et al. 2009; Price et al. 2009). It was also recognized that of the 10 million, the vast majority contained matters pertaining to criminal, rather than political, investigations (Morales Alvarado 2009). The pilot study was carried out to identify a sampling process that would allow the full study to efficiently identify the most relevant information. To conduct the pilot study, we engaged in a stratified random sampling process to identify what information was recorded in different portions of the archive.<sup>12</sup> Information in the AHPN is archived based on the organizational structure of the police force. Each file is indexed based on the office that the file was created for or sent to and there exists separate archive locations for each of the different offices of the police ranging from the 10 *cuernos* that formed operational units of the police force, through the different specialized offices and up to the Director General (chief of police). Records produced by the various divisions of the police and stored in the AHPN cover the full spectrum of police activities. On one end lie the most intensive acts of political repression, such as a directive to capture a list of suspected subversives with their last known whereabouts, to the most mundane, such

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<sup>12</sup> The pilot study also engaged in other sampling procedures, including clustered random sampling and truly random sampling. Results proved substantively similar.

as the hundreds of thousands of orders for officers to appear before the court at a given time and place.<sup>13</sup>

Within this archive structure, the pilot study sampled documents at random from each of the different offices and *cuerpos*. Through this process, it was possible to decipher which office was receiving which type of information and how that information could be accessed. We discovered that more than 95% of the relevant documents (documents containing information on political behavior committed by members of civil society, social movements, political parties, security forces or members of the government) were located in two offices—the Director General’s office and the Office for Coordinating Military and Police Activity.

With this knowledge, the next stage in the process was to generate an events database recording information on political activity identified in the records of these two offices. I began the full study in October 2010. Over the next eight months, the full study of the document read each of the more than 120,000 documents indexed by the archive under these two offices. In total, more than a quarter million pages were read encapsulating every file sent to either the Director General’s office and the Office for Coordinating Military and Police Activity. From each file, the full study coded all politically relevant events into the database using a coding rubric that included nearly one hundred event types.<sup>14</sup> Each event entered into the dataset as individual rows, with the columns registering the different characteristics coded.

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<sup>13</sup> The reports vary significantly in length, from short missives from the field to lengthy investigations or security plans. Some of the longer documents contained multiple political activities, which enter into the database as separate events.

<sup>14</sup> In our reading of the documents from the police archive, we found that nearly all of the files could be classified as either ‘political’ or ‘criminal/personal’ in nature. Events in the latter category, included

The final coding protocol is detailed below:

## Guatemala Coding Protocol 2.0

08/10/10

Note: The coding protocol employed in this study built upon an early study of the archive by a team of researchers lead by Benetech's Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG). Consequently, parts of the coding protocol refer to Benetech's protocol, which can be found within the study's main protocol. Additional details of the Benetech study can be found in their publication: Proyecto de Recuperacion del Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional. 2009. *El Derecho a Saber: Informe especial del Archivo Historico de la Policia Nacional*. Procuraduria de los Derechos Humanos. Guatemala City.

### A. Coder

### B. Location of Event –

Street

City/Town

Municipality

Municipality # - Select from XLS file

Department

### C. Date of Event

Day

Month

Year

### D. Political Repression

Select Yes or No based on the following event codes:

Overt Repression was measured using the following codes: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 54, 55, 57, 58, 78, 84, 85.

Covert Repression was measured using the following codes: 41, 42, 71, 74, 86.

Measures of all repressive behavior utilize the sum of Overt and Covert repressive behaviors.

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criminal investigations and procedures as well as personal struggles such as household conflict, were dismissed. For a critical discussion of this distinction see Tilly (2003, 21).

E. Principal Subject Identified –

Note:

Select from the list of social movement organizations found in Benetech Appendix 20

**Apéndice 20.**  
**H13. – Sector**

<b>Código</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Código</b>	<b>Sector</b>
<b>SIND</b>	Sindicato	<b>ESME</b>	Estudiante Educación Media
<b>GRCA</b>	Grupos Campesinos	<b>POBL</b>	Pobladores
<b>GRPA</b>	Grupos paramilitares de Ultraderecha	<b>ESUN</b>	Estudiante Universitario
<b>FUSE</b>	Fuerzas de Seguridad	<b>AMCA</b>	Amas de Casa
<b>INGL</b>	Afiliación con Iglesias	<b>FAVI</b>	Familiares y Amigos de la Víctima
<b>INSR</b>	Insurgente	<b>MENO</b>	Menores de edad
<b>MAGI</b>	Magisterio	<b>POPA</b>	Policías Particulares
<b>JUST</b>	Justicia	<b>DEPA</b>	De Paso
<b>SOOR</b>	Social Organizados	<b>ASOE</b>	Asociaciones Estudiantiles
<b>PROF</b>	Profesionales	<b>COIN</b>	Comunidad Internacional
<b>SUNI</b>	Sector Universitario (dirigentes, estudiantes, profesores, administrativos)	<b>OTRO</b>	otro

F. Subject Suspected of ties to the Insurgency

Yes or No

G. Mobilization –

Select Yes or No based on the following event codes:

Note:

Mobilization was measured using the following codes: 21, 61, 71, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 87

H. Radical or Non-radical Mobilization

Select Yes or No based on the following movement codes:

Note:

Radical Mobilization was defined as mobilization with the following movement organizations as the principal subjects (Code E above): INSR (Marxist insurgents), SIND (Radical Labor Organizations), SUNI (Revolutionary Student Groups), as well as when

column F (“subject suspected of ties to the insurgency” was coded YES). Because the organizations were coded into movement categories based on the demands they were pursuing, they function as excellent indicators for whether the ideals around which the movements were mobilizing qualify as “radical” or “non-radical.” All mobilization activities not affiliated with these subjects were coded as “non-radical”

#### I. Overt Collective Challenges

Select Yes or No based on the following event codes:

Note:

Overt Collective Challenges were measured using the following codes: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 16, 19, 23, 25, 55, 57, 58, 78.

#### Event Types

- 0- **Unknown**
- 1- **Other** (*coding to be used sparingly; email Chris if you think you have an example*)
- 2- **Accident**

#### *Harassment*

- 3- **Verbal Harassment/Written Harassment/Death Threat**  
(Perpetrator may be a civilian, a soldier, or a policeman)
- 4- **Warning** (more benign)

#### *Individual and Group Violence*

- 5- **Indiscriminate violence /Massacre:** Organized violence carried out intentionally and without regard for the individual identities of those killed. Generally involves the violation of multiple individuals simultaneously.
- 6- **Targeted Attacks/Killings—Political or Military Target:** Organized violence directed at an individual because of actions they took related to their political or organizational affiliations. The violated individual was unable or unlikely to retaliate. (Includes assassinations)
- 7- **Targeted Attacks/Killings—Sectarian Target:** Organized violence directed at an individual because of actions they took related to their sect. The violated individual was unable or unlikely to retaliate. (Includes assassinations)
- 8- **Brawl/Clash:** Two groups at protests; tumultuous back and forth (less than a battle); brawls happen in places like lunchrooms, bars, etc

- 9- **Battle:** Two **organized bodies** engaging in armed combat **Shootout:** Violence between two **disorganized** bodies, or between one **organized** body and one **disorganized** body
- 10- **Riot/Mob violence/Looting**

*Marches, Protest and Political Events*

- 11- **Debate/verbal argument/Non-violent confrontation** (more of a back and forth between parties)
- 12- **Political March** (usually focused on civil rights issues)
- 13- **Sectarian March** (focused primarily on the Catholic/Protestant divide)
- 14- **Vigil**
- 15- **Speech** - Public or Private
- 16- **Strike/Picket** (specifically about labor issues)
- 17- **Public gathering/Meeting**
- 18- **Ceremony/Symbolic display by Government**
- 19- **Ceremony/Symbolic display by protestors/dissidents**
- 20- **Funeral Procession** (usually more of a *preceding event*)
- 21- **Information distribution:** tabling, press conference, graffiti
- 22- **Hunger strike**
- 23- **Protest/Civil Disobedience/Barricades** (organized; e.g., sit-ins, smaller gatherings)
- 24- **Protest Ban** (political ban)
- 25- **Counter-protest** (acts in a sequential manner: “This group is protesting—so will we!”)
- 26- **Complaint filing/Seeking legal advice**
- 27- **National Policy Change**
- 28- **Local Level Policy Change:** at the neighborhood, city level, etc.
- 29- **End of Ceasefire**
- 30- **Ceasefire/Peace talks/negotiations/international negotiations**
- 31- **Release of hostages/prisoners**
- 32- **Elections**

*Policing*

- 33- **Selective Arrest/Attempted Arrest**
- 34- **Non-Selective Arrest/Non-Selective Attempted Arrest**
- 35- **Mass Arrest** (indiscriminate in nature)
- 36- **Informed/cooperated with Police/Military or Asked to inform/cooperate with Police/Military**
- 37- **operations con junta con el ejercicio**
- 38- **Police (or Army) Road Block/Checkpoint/Patrol** [a patrol is not defined as harassment]
- 39- **Police Search**

- 40- **Police curfew** (usually more of a *preceding event*)
- 41- **Chase/Police Chase**
- 42- **State Surveillance**
- 43- **Police Abuse during detention/arrest**
- 44- **Protest Policing/Riot policing- No Live Rounds** (the policing in question must be within the bounds of legal protest/riot police work, even if distasteful)
- 45- **Protest Policing—Live Rounds**
- 46- **Other forms of state repression** (*coding to be used sparingly*)

*Paramilitary violence*

- 47- **Intra-communal violence/social control:** Paramilitary groups imposing sanctions on their own communities for behavior deemed anti-social. The difference between internal policing and social control is that internal policing has to do with the politics internal to an organization, while social control has to do with sanctioning an individual for allegedly violating social norms
- 48- **Turf war/Territorial dispute**
- 49- **Gang violence**
- 50- **Ethnic derogation/Ethnic violence**
- 51- **Intra-organizational violence/internal policing**

*Other Forms of Violence*

- 52- **Torture, mental or physical**
- 53- **Beating** (seen as 1 guy being attacked by multiple assailants; either civilian or police)
- 54- **Suicide/Attempted Suicide**
- 55- **Hijacking/Kidnapping**
- 56- **Rape/Sexual Assault/Sexual Harassment**
- 57- **Raid/Siege:** can be carried out by police, but does not have to be (raid and siege are distinguished by differing levels of violence)
- 58- **Robbery**
- 59- **Provocation by Victim**
- 60- **Provocation by Perpetrator**
- 61- **Arms Purchased by Insurgent, or Insurgent Friends/Kin**
- 62- **Arms Purchase by State, or State Friends/Kin**
- 63- **Victim Taken to Hospital/Doctor**
- 64- **Public Sympathy for Victim**
- 65- **Ethnic Migration**
- 66- **Public Sympathy of Perpetrator**
- 67- **Forcibly Evicted**

## Miscellaneous

- 68- **Non-Violent Trauma**
- 69- **Initiate an investigation**
- 70- **secure a perimeter**
- 71- **combat training**
- 72- **inform superiors**
- 73- **legal procedures/trial**
- 74- **solicited international actions**
- 75- **“non-violent mobilization” activities designed to encourage people to participate in political protest**
- 76- **Violent mobilization**
- 77- **Formation of an armed group**
- 78- **Terrorism**
- 79- **Membership in insurgent organizations/Contributing to the insurgency**
- 80- **Clandestine Meeting**
- 81- **Membership in a social movement organization/contributing to a social movement organization**
- 82- **Violent Trauma**
- 83- **Pre-emptive Security Measures**
- 84- **Subject Dissappeared/kidnapped**
- 85- **Subject murdered**
- 86- **Inform inferiors/rank and file**
- 87- **Planning Violent Actions**
- 88- **Defection to Army – No Amnesty**
- 89- **Defection to Army – Amnesty**
- 90- **Return of Refugees**
- 91- **Refugees flee across border**
- 92- **Possession of illegal literature**

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